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Highlights
￿ Europe has responded to the crisis with strengthened budgetary and macroeco-
nomic surveillance, the creation of the European Stability Mechanism, liquidity
provisioning by resilient economies and the European Central Bank and a process
towards a banking union. However, a monetary union requires some form of budget
for fiscal stabilisation in case of shocks, and as a backstop to the banking union.
￿ This paper compares four quantitatively different schemes of fiscal stabilisation
and  proposes a new scheme based on GDP-indexed bonds. The options conside-
red are: (i) A federal budget with unemployment and corporate taxes shifted to
euro-area level; (ii) a support scheme based on deviations from potential output;
(iii) an insurance scheme via which governments would issue bonds indexed to
GDP, and (iv) a scheme in which access to jointly guaranteed borrowing is combi-
ned with gradual withdrawal of fiscal sovereignty.
￿ Our comparison is based on strong assumptions. We carry out a preliminary, limited
simulation of how the debt-to-GDP ratio would have developed between 2008-14
under the four schemes for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and an ‘average’ coun-
try. The schemes have varying implications in each case for debt sustainability.
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IN THE 1970s, the consensus among European
policymakers was that if monetary union was to
be pursued, a federal budget would also be estab-
lished. In the late 1970s, a report to the European
Commission by a group chaired by Sir Donald Mac-
Dougall concluded that a federal budget of the
order of 5-7 percent of GDP would be appropriate
to support a monetary union1. Twelve years later,
however, the Delors Report that provided the blue-
print for Economic and Monetary Union would take
for granted that the common budget would remain
very small, with stabilisation assigned to national
budgets2. In the event, the euro came into being
in 1999 without having been preceded by any
increase in the size of the EU budget.
In the Maastricht Treaty, all responsibility for
stabilisation was therefore assigned to national
budgets. In the words of the Stability and Growth
Pact, in normal times governments were asked to
keep their budgets ‘close to balance or in surplus’
so that in times of recession they could let tax
receipts decrease and deficits balloon, providing
thereby some degree of automatic stabilisation. It
was even envisaged (though reluctantly) that
states could embark on discretionary stimulus3.
Maastricht was not fully respected. Most states
did not follow the Commission’s recommendation
to use good times to eliminate the deficit and
create a buffer for stabilisation in bad times. On
the contrary many used higher tax revenues
during the booms to lower taxes and spend more,
and found themselves forced to tighten in reces-
sion episodes, such as the one that followed the
bursting of the dot-com bubble. Some did follow
the script however: The governments in Spain and
Ireland fulfilled their Treaty obligations and moved
into surplus (Spain) or balance (Ireland). In 2007,
their debt ratios were well below the Maastricht
threshold of 60  percent  of GDP. They were sup-
posed to be ready for bad times.
When bad times – really bad times – came,
however, the buffer proved much too small. In the
course of two years, from 2007 to 2009, Spain
moved from a 2 percent of GDP surplus to an 11
percent deficit; Ireland went from balance to a 14
percent deficit. Worries about state solvency soon
manifested themselves through higher borrowing
costs and rising default premia. Under pressure
from markets and European commitments, by
2010 governments started a consolidation
process to bring deficits back to sustainable
levels.
The 2009 recession was admittedly of centennial
magnitude globally and its impact was magnified
by the bursting of a real estate bubble in both
Spain and Ireland. So it may be unfair to use this
episode to assess the capability for stabilisation
provided by Maastricht. Markets and
governments, however, will for a long time live in
the shadow of the experience of the first decade
of the 2000s. When the next recession comes, the
markets will be more concerned about solvency,
and governments more eager to avoid entering the
danger zone than they were in 2009.
States are furthermore much more vulnerable
than they were a few years ago, when the public
debt ratio was 40 percent in Spain and 25 percent
in Ireland. According to the European Commis-
sion’s latest forecast, of the 17 members of the
euro area, six (Belgium, Ireland, Greece, Italy,
Cyprus and Portugal) are expected to record public
debt in excess of 100 percent of GDP in 2014 and
two others (Spain and France) are expected to be
above 90 percent. Until debt has been reduced to
much lower levels, there will be limits to the
degree of stabilisation that can be achieved
through national budgets.
There is therefore a need to avoid the impairment
of the stabilisation role of the national budget, or to
substitute it if it cannot be repaired.
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4. For a more detailed
description, see Wolff
(2012).
5. Asdrubali et al(1996)
find that credit market
smoothing by US states
decreases when the shock
is more persistent.
How can this be done? In this paper we examine
four options:
i A federal euro-area budget (expected to be in
the order of magnitude of 2 percent of GDP);
ii A support scheme based on deviations from
potential output;
iii A scheme whereby governments would issue
bonds indexed to GDP (debt as equity).
iv Quotas for the issuance of mutually guaranteed
debt.
THE RATIONALE FOR AN INTEGRATED BUDGETARY
FRAMEWORK
All federations have sizeable federal budgets4.
Empirically, such budgets therefore appear to be a
natural complement to areas with integrated
monetary policies. The founders of Europe’s
monetary union discussed this question and
eventually decided that in Europe, stabilisation
policy could be exercised at the national level.
Assuming that automatic stabilisers imply that a 1
percent GDP decline translates into a 0.5 percent
of GDP budgetary shortfall, starting from balance,
automatic stabilisers could fully react to a 6
percent decline in output before the 3 percent
Maastricht deficit level was reached. It was judged
that a 6 percent decline in GDP was very unlikely.
The violence of this crisis has shown the limits to
this approach. When the crisis started in countries
such as Spain and Greece, corporate and house-
hold deleveraging took on huge proportions. Those
two sectors increased their savings rates by 12
percentage points and more, leading to a collapse
of GDP, income and government revenues. The
fiscal accommodation had to be, and actually was,
substantial, leading to clearly unsustainable
deficits of well above 10 percent of GDP. Contain-
ing the deficit within the 3 percent limit would
have led to a massive contraction.
The combination of high private debt and fast-
rising public debt, major price adjustment needs
and continued private deleveraging led to
‘All federations have sizeable federal budgets. The founders of Europe’s monetary union
discussed this question and decided that in Europe, stabilisation policy could be exercised at
the national level. The violence of this crisis has shown the limits to this approach.’
dramatic market reactions. The limits to purely
national stabilisation policy became very visible
as entire economies were priced out of the market.
An old insight from the theory of fiscal federalism
turned out to be true: regional stabilisation can
become quite ineffective (Oates 1968).
The euro area has put in place a significant
response to counteract and limit the damage from
this massive deleveraging process and the
heightened market pressure.
￿ First, a European Stability Mechanism (ESM)
safety net was created. The main aim of the
ESM is to provide access to finance in cases of
acute market-financing difficulty. It is an
important addition to the European policy
architecture but does not provide support to
countries still benefitting from market access.
On the contrary, it may lead them to implement
procyclical fiscal policies in order to avoid the
stigma of conditional assistance. 
￿ The second response was a very sizeable
provisioning of liquidity by the European
Central Bank. This helped to finance banks in
the south of Europe, many of which were and
still are shut out of the market. Abundant ECB
liquidity has thereby helped prevent a major
banking crisis and has reduced funding
tensions. But ECB liquidity has in fact
substituted private credit markets at a time
when they were playing a major destabilising
role. It has not tackled the absence of fiscal
stabilisation.
￿ The third response was an agreement to form a
banking union in order to break the vicious
circle connecting banks and sovereigns. A
functioning banking union would allow credit
markets to act as stabilisers. However, it is not
certain that the credit channel by itself can
provide enough stabilisation5.
Put differently, would a ‘Maastricht+’ construction
consisting of an ESM, a fully fledged banking
union, and tighter surveillance mechanisms to
prevent macroeconomic imbalances provide asufficient basis for a common monetary union?
We believe it would suffer from a number of major
shortcomings:
￿ While good surveillance mechanisms are very
much desirable, the accumulation of large
debts in the private sector cannot be excluded.
Episodes of major private-sector deleveraging
require temporary but significant fiscal
responses. A banking union cannot fully
compensate for such problems because
private sector deleveraging can be distinct from
banking-sector problems. Given recent history,
governments are likely to be much more
reluctant to embark on stabilising initiatives in
the event of adverse shocks for fear of testing
the limits of market forbearance.
￿ Maastricht+ would not solve a fundamental
coordination problem. In case of a severe
recession in the euro area as a whole, the fiscal
policy reaction is likely to be insufficient
because countries will attempt to free-ride on
one another. The European response in 2009
was still relatively well coordinated, with
Germany and Spain providing the largest
discretionary fiscal stimuli. Yet the current
downturn shows little coordination in terms of
fiscal response. The easiest way of achieving
an adequate fiscal response in the area as a
whole would be to have an area-wide
macroeconomic stabilisation instrument. 
￿ A common resolution authority needs to be
viable and credible. The example of the US
authority responsible for resolving banks, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
shows that taxpayer support may not be
necessary. Yet, the credibility and
effectiveness of FDIC action crucially depends
on the ultimate backing of the US treasury. The
US treasury in turn is credible because it has
access to tax resources and can borrow.
￿ The participating countries’ debt and deficit
levels are far higher than those that would be
required for Maastricht+ to work. The increased
contamination of the banking system with
sovereign debt renders debt resolution options
via restructuring even more difficult than five
years ago.
For these reasons we believe that more significant
steps towards euro-area fiscal integration need to
be taken. Ultimately, a monetary union that is
supposed to be stable requires risk-sharing
mechanisms.  Such mechanisms would allow
large adverse business-cycle effects to be
mitigated. As with normal insurance, such
mechanisms are not needed for small incidents
but rather for large and unexpected events. We are
aware that such steps cannot be taken lightly.
They create major incentives for bad policies at a
national level and moral hazard issues run very
deep. As with any form of insurance, strong
measures need to be taken to prevent free-riding
behaviour. In the case of Europe, this will
ultimately require Treaty changes.
COMPARING THE FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF
DIFFERENT OPTIONS
A number of different approaches to fiscal
stabilisation in the euro area have been proposed
(Wolff, 2012). This section introduces selected
options and compares them qualitatively. The
most important points of comparison are
economic effects, practical feasibility and political
realism. A particularly important question is if the
possible approaches actually solve the main
identified problem, which is to provide insurance
against major risks. In particular, four proposals
are reviewed.
The first approachconsists of a fully federal model
in which both actual spending and revenues are
shifted to the euro-area level. The basic idea is to
shift those items that have a high elasticity to
income to the federal level. In the Annex, we
consider a system in which unemployment
expenditure is transferred to the federal level. This
expenditure is financed by introducing a federal
corporate tax. Thereby, relatively strong stabilisers
would be created.
The advantage of this scheme   would be that
stabilisation would result from the normal
operation of a federal budget. There are two
drawbacks. First, it is not easy to identify public
goods that would be (a) common as opposed to
national and (b) euro-area specific rather than
common to all EU countries. Second, to be
effective, a small budget would need to rely on
highly elastic revenues, which at aggregate level
would make it prone to significant shifts between
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04surplus and deficit. Finally, those goods that
typically exhibit stabilisation functions, such as
unemployment insurance, often reflect societal
preferences and therefore do not qualify easily as
euro-area public goods (Wolff, 2012).
The second scheme would consist of a relatively
simple rule building on the current fiscal
framework. Deviations of output from potential
would trigger support payments. Ideally, those
payments would only start in case of large output
gaps. In our scheme, the transfers are based on
absolute (not relative) deviations of output from
potential. Since business cycles are correlated in
the euro area, the capacity would need to borrow
during recessions and would balance out only
over the business cycle6. A scheme based on
deviations from the euro-area output gap, which
could achieve real-time budget balance, would be
economically and politically more difficult as
countries in recessions would borrow to provide
support to countries in worse recessions.
The advantages of the scheme are that existing
government spending and revenue structures
could remain unaltered (no transfer of
competence to a new federal institution would be
required) and that its stabilisation power could be
maximised for any given level of contributions.
Moreover, payments would by definition be
temporary, thereby avoiding undesirable
continued dependence on funds. The drawbacks
are that it would rely on technical assumptions
about potential output and limited flexibility to
adjust to specific types of crisis7.
The  third scheme has been proposed in the
abstract (Borensztein and Mauro, 2004) but we
have not encountered any application to the euro
area. The idea would be to let sovereigns issue
GDP-indexed bonds, the value of which would
depend on the state of the economy. In the event
of a recession, the value of these securities would
decline, forcing holders to take a hit and provide
the insurance function.
The elegance of this approach is that it starts from
the recognition that sovereign liabilities are a more
risky asset in a monetary union; hence, the
requirement that some of them be issued in the
form of equity. This would ultimately mean that
fewer risk-free assets would be available for
institutional investors. This would force
substitution away from government debt in
Europe towards other forms of investment
including debt abroad and corporate bonds. The
drawback is that financing of government debt will
become more expensive. Also, stabilisation at
country level would in fact come from the holding
of debt by non-residents only (as wealth effects
between government and private residents would
not improve domestic stabilisation).
Instead of creating new stabilisation instruments,
the logic of the fourth optionis to rescue the Maas-
tricht assignment by permitting states to borrow
even in situations of stress. This would require the
euro-area partners providing the lenders with a
repayment guarantee. This approach is similar to
the ESM financial assistance scheme, which starts
from the recognition that market access can dry
up, and which enables countries to borrow via the
ESM at lower rates. The difference compared to the
ESM would be that cheaper access could be given
earlier without the stigma of a programme – akin
to the IMF’s flexible credit line. The proposed
scheme could work in the following way: in normal
times, sovereigns would issue, say, 20 percent of
their GDP in the form of Eurobonds, so that there
would be a liquid market for them. A second
tranche of, say, 20 percent of GDP would be avail-
able with only light conditions and would be
intended to serve as a buffer for states willing to
borrow in times of stress before they have to apply
to a fully-fledged ESM programme8. Access to the
scheme would be guaranteed to states meeting a
number of ex-ante criteria. The advantage of the
scheme would be to build on the existing logic of
the Maastricht Treaty and of that of conditional
assistance. The drawback is the reliance on con-
troversial Eurobonds.
Table 1 on the next page summarises the options.
SIMULATIONS
To assess quantitatively the economic impact of
the different instruments and the ability of those
instruments to provide insurance against major
shocks, Table 2 on the next page presents the
results of counterfactual thought experiments. It
describes what would have been the result in
6. A natural way to pay the
debt incurred in recessions
would be to extract
payments from countries
with output above potential
in good times.
7. A variant of this scheme
is proposed and discussed
in Wolff (2012).
8. A variant of such a
scheme has been been
proposed by Enderlein et al
(2012).
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05terms of debt-to-GDP ratios in Greece, Ireland
Portugal and Spain if the respective schemes had
been in place at the end of 2007. Obviously, such
a counterfactual is fraught with major difficulties,
such as GDP developments and political
dynamics, which may have been dissimilar under
different schemes. The simulations are
deliberately simplified and take a mechanical
approach by focusing in each of the four cases
exclusively on the analysis of the proposed
stabilisation tool. We do not try to create a
comprehensive counterfactual macroeconomic
scenario by incorporating fiscal response
functions, changes in market confidence or other
elements. We only estimate the support
payments/government savings from each of the
four schemes and subtract them from the actual
debt-to-GDP ratio to yield our naïve counterfactual
estimate. The assumptions of each scenario are
explained in more detail in the Annex.
Table 2 documents the effect of the schemes on
the debt-to-GDP ratio in the four economies.
Clearly, the mechanisms would have implied very
different debt dynamics. The ‘southern country’
included in the table is a generic crisis country
that has the average characteristics of the four
countries studied. It can be used to compare
different schemes on an aggregate level.
Before comparing the schemes, it must be strictly
noted that they are not calibrated to be
commensurate. Some provide much more
stabilisation than others because they involve
higher transfers. At this stage we do not provide
an evaluation of the relative effectiveness of the
schemes for a similar amount of resources. Also, it
must be noted that we do not provide a
macroeconomic assessment. For example, we do
not study the economic and financial effects of
substituting GDP-indexed bonds to standard
bonds in private portfolios. In part, such bonds will
result in the transfer of volatility from the public
sector to the private sector. Here, we only look at
the public sector.
The different schemes have very different effects
depending on the country in question. According
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Table 1: Features and properties of four stabilisation options
Euro-area budget Automatic transfer
scheme
Debt as equity Guaranteed bonds
quota
Principle Automatic stabilisation
role of federal budget
Transfers based on
output gap
Part of debt issued in
the form of GDP-
indexed bonds 
Right to issue jointly
guaranteed bonds
(several tranches with
increased withdrawal
of sovereignty)
Origin of
stabilisation
Income transfer from
partners
Income transfer from
partners
Wealth transfer from
(non-resident)
bondholders
Borrowing capacity,
mutualisation of
default risk
Advantages True budget Maximises stabilisation
power for any given symet-
ric level of contributions
Recognises risky
character of
government debt
Builds on Maastricht
logic that stabilisation
is done nationally
Drawbacks Difficulty to agree on euro-
area public goods. Budget
balance prone to volatility.
Large variation in societal
preferences over proposed
federal budget items.
Incentive effects.
Relies on technical
potential output
assumptions.
Real-time estimate
uncertainty.
Untested instrument,
higher cost of borrowing
for sovereigns,
stabilisation comes from
non-resident holdings
only
Requires controversial
Eurobonds
Source: Bruegel.
Table 2: Reduction in 2014 debt-to-GDP ratio
(percentage points) based on diﬀerent scenarios
Country Euro-area
budget
Automatic
transfer
scheme
Debt as
equity
Guaranteed
bonds
quota
Greece -1.2 14.4 12 4.4
Ireland 11.1 2.6 5.3 3.1
Portugal -0.5 4.4 4.3 3.2
Spain 10.6 6.2 5.3 2.4
Southern
country
5.7 6.7 7.8 3.4
Source: Bruegel. Note: Simulations are based on simpliﬁed assump-
tions and only serve illustrative purposes. More research is
required to make a detailed assessment. Positive numbers mean
debt reduction, negative numbers a debt increase.07
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to the effects on the generic ‘southern country’,
the federal budget, transfers based on the output
gap and GDP indexing of bonds would have
reduced debt levels in a comparable fashion. The
federal borrowing quota would have had a smaller
effect because of its limited scale. Here, the quota
is not assumed to induce additional borrowing; it
replaces some of the national borrowing at high
rates by lower yielding federally guaranteed
bonds.
However, on a country-level there is significant
variation in the effects of each scheme. For Spain
and Ireland, the federal budget has the biggest
impact because their significant spending on
unemployment would have been subtracted from
the budget deficits because it would have become
a federal responsibility. This measure can be
misleading though. Because Spain has a more
generous unemployment system than the euro-
area average, the centralisation of the system
would have led to lower transfers to Spanish
residents suffering from unemployment. This
would have reduced domestic demand and
therefore offset part of the reduction in the debt-
to-GDP ratio. On the other hand, countries such as
Portugal and Greece that have less generous
systems, and hence derive less budget benefits
from moving this spending to the federal level,
would have received a demand boost from federal
transfers. Accounting for this demand effect tends
to narrow the actual beneficial effects from the
federal budget across countries.
We find that Greece would have benefitted
significantly from transfers based on the output
gap and GDP-linked bonds, because its output gap
is assumed to be very sizeable (an average of -7.7
percent during 2008-14 according to AMECO), and
its nominal GDP growth has fallen the most relative
to expectations in 2008. Conversely, because
Portugal’s output gap is estimated to be smaller
(average of -2.8 percent) and its growth has
disappointed by less, it benefits less from the two
schemes.
The different stabilisation mechanisms are not
necessarily substitutes and they can indeed be
considered as complements. A combination of
them could have very significant stabilising
effects.
CONCLUSIONS 
This Policy Contribution has argued that an inte-
grated European fiscal capacity would make the
euro area more stable if it is constructed so that it
can cover major risks. We have evaluated a
number of recent proposals and have also pro-
posed a new mechanism based on GDP-indexed
bonds. Our conclusion is that euro-area fiscal
schemes would have potentially significant sta-
bilisation properties but also possibly significant
distributional effects, as their impact on southern
euro-area countries would be different.
This shows the difficulty of conceiving and
supplementing a euro-area stabilisation
mechanism. It would be advisable to pursue the
evaluation of the issue further, so that workable
options can be presented to European leaders.
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ANNEX
Simulations
A federal euro-area budget insuring countries
against negative income shocks
In this section we assume the existence from the
beginning of 2008  of a federal budget that would
have provided unemployment benefits. Its rev-
enues would have come from a federal corporate
income tax.
Such a system would lead to inter-country trans-
fers if labour market institutions were not har-
monised. Figure 1 represents the differences in
the generosity of the unemployment benefit sys-
tems in the euro area. The correlation between the
unemployment rate and unemployment expendi-
ture is far from perfect. For instance, Belgium has
the highest expenditure on unemployment
although its unemployment rate is below the euro-
area average, reflecting a relatively generous
system9.
Figure 1: Unemployment rate and government
expenditure on unemployment in 2010
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat.
To judge the magnitude of a federal budget, we
studied the amount of total government expendi-
ture on unemployment (Eurostat). The euro area
spent 1.8 percent on unemployment mitigation on
average from 2002-10. During the same period,
corporate taxes averaged 2.7 percent of GDP. In
order to balance revenue with expenditure on
average we concluded that a federal budget would
need a corporate tax that would provide revenues
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equivalent to 1.8 percent of euro-area GDP over
the business cycle.
By using AMECO data on corporate earnings10, we
find that the average corporate tax rate that would
have generated 1.8 percent of GDP in income
during 2002-10 is 12.6 percent. Hence, by multi-
plying the gross earnings of corporations by 12.6
percent, we yield the amount of federally col-
lected corporate tax revenue11.
To calculate the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio
with a federal budget, we first subtract from the
deficits of the four countries the lost revenue
caused by moving part of the corporate tax rev-
enue to the federal level. To compensate for this,
the federal budget takes care of all the costs of
unemployment benefits. Therefore the total effect
on the budget is the sum of the lost revenue and
the reduced spending. For example, the tax rate of
12.6 percent would have generated 1.9 percent of
Irish GDP in revenues in 2010. In the same year,
expenditure on unemployment in Ireland equalled
3.5%/GDP. Therefore, Ireland would have benefited
from the scheme by 3.5 – 1.9 = 1.6%/GDP in
201012.
We need to project government expenditure on
unemployment because the series extends only
until 2010. We estimate country-specific elastici-
ties by estimating the following regression for
each country separately.
The elasticity (coefficient β) ranges from 0.08 for
Portugal to 0.234 for Ireland. Ireland therefore has
the most elastic system in which the GDP share of
unemployment expenditure increases by 0.23
percent for every percentage point increase in the
unemployment rate; Portugal has the least elas-
tic system.
Figure 2 summarises the effects of a federal
budget on the debt-to-GDP ratios of the four coun-
tries in 2014. We have added (as in the other
schemes) a generic ‘southern country’ to facilitate
the comparison of alternative schemes on an
aggregate level. In all exercises, we assume that
 
x …  
9. For a more detailed
analysis of the differences
between labour market
institutions and outcomes,
see Wolff (2012).
10. We use the series ‘Gross
balance of primary income
(UBGC)’ to measure
earnings subject to a
corporate tax.
11. We therefore ignore the
lags and elasticity frictions
of the corporate income tax.
12. In this version, the
federal corporate tax is fully
offset by reducing national
corporate taxes.‘southern country’ had a debt-to-GDP ratio of 60
percent at the end of 2007. In this exercise, its cor-
porate tax revenues are the average of the rev-
enues of the four countries, as is its
unemployment expenditure and elasticity. In
addition to the cumulative effect in 2014, we pro-
vide time-series of the debt-to-GDP ratio at the end
of the Annex.
Figure 2: Decline in debt-to-GDP ratio (percent-
points) in 2014  as a result of the federal budget
Source: Bruegel calculations.
Under the scheme, Spain would have lowered its
debt-to-GDP ratio in 2014 by 10.6 percentage
points  but Portugal (and Greece) would have
experienced virtually no change. The reason is
that unemployment benefit expenditure in Portu-
gal is at a low level (an average of 1.2 percent of
GDP during 2002-10), which means that the
reduced expenditure from eliminating this from
the national budget is limited. Spain on the other
hand has high unemployment expenditures both
because of the relatively high generosity and high
unemployment.
Figure 2 can, however, be misleading. It does not
take into account the relative magnitude of the
unemployment benefit transfers with and without
the federal budget, which the residents in the four
countries receive but which do not affect the debt-
to-GDP ratio of the countries directly. Nevertheless
they affect domestic demand. If a country would
have spent more on unemployment alone than via
the transfers it receives from the federal budget,
domestic demand would have been reduced and
this would have indirectly affected the debt-to-
GDP ratio.
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In order to analyse these indirect effects we study
unemployment rates and unemployment
expenditure in 2008, which is assumed to be the
introduction year of the federal budget.
Unemployment in the euro area was 7.6 percent
and expenditure at 1.5 percent of GDP. To calculate
the flow of transfers from the federal government,
we assume that spending responds to deviations
of the unemployment rate from the euro-area
average by a common elasticity. We calculate the
average elasticity of unemployment expenditure
to the unemployment rate in the euro area during
2002-10. This is done in a panel regression setting
including all 17 euro-area countries for 2002-10.
The regression is of the form:
The estimate for the β coefficient is 0.12, mean-
ing that a one percentage point increase in the
unemployment rate increases expenditure on
unemployment by 0.12 percent of GDP. The coef-
ficients αi account for the country-specific fixed
effects. The R2of the regression is 0.59. With the
calculated elasticity and unemployment rate pro-
jections (AMECO) we are able to forecast the evo-
lution of unemployment expenditure from the
common scheme.
For instance, in Portugal unemployment in 2008
was 8.5 percent. Therefore it would have received
federal transfers amounting to 1.5 + (8.5 – 7.6) *
0.12 = 1.6% of GDP in 2008. Because the actual
spending on unemployment benefits in Portugal
in 2010 was only 1 percent, the difference would
have constituted a stimulus of 0.6 percent of GDP
relative to what actually happened. On the other
hand, under a common unemployment benefit
scheme, Ireland would have received transfers of
only 2.3 percent of GDP in 2010, whereas it actu-
ally spent 3.5 percent of its GDP on unemploy-
ment. Consequently the move to a common
unemployment benefit system would have tight-
ened the fiscal position in Ireland by 1.2 percent if
some of the improvement in public finances
(Figure 2) had not been used to counteract this.
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deviations from potential output
Wolff (2012) has evaluated the need for a
common euro-area budget and proposed different
forms that this could take. One of these is the idea
that the euro-area budget would provide insurance
to countries based on deviations from potential
output. If the output gap of a country would
become more negative than a given threshold (x
percent of GDP), the country would receive
transfers worth y percent of that output gap.
Because Wolff (2012) argues that the common
budget would be used only for sizeable shocks
that could not be taken care of nationally, we have
here used x = -2%. So the insurance kicks in only if
the (negative) output gap is more than 2 percent.
Also, to limit moral hazard, the degree of insurance
is set at less than unity, namely y = 25%.
Consequently, if a country has an output gap of 3
percent, it will receive 3% * 25% = 0.75% of GDP as
a transfer from the federation13. The above choices
of x and y are only for the sake of simplification.
In reality, any scheme would have to be phased
to avoid a huge incentive to distort the numbers14.
Given those assumptions, we calculate how the
debt-to-GDP ratio of the four countries would have
developed since the end of 2007. For debt and
output we use data from the October 2012 World
Economic Outlook, whereas for the output gap we
use estimates from the European Commission,
which would presumably be in charge of the
calculations underlying the transfer payments.
In addition to the individual four countries, we also
calculate the effect on a generic country called
‘southern country’, to be able to compare the
different schemes (i)-(iv) on an aggregate level.
The output gap and nominal GDP growth of
‘southern country’ is the average of the four
countries.
According to Figure 3, most of the four countries
have had an output gap greater than -2 percent
since 2009. It is noteworthy that Ireland is
assumed to reach potential output between 2013
and 2014.
By summing up the transfer payments in different
years we can calculate by how much the scheme
would have reduced debt-to-GDP ratios in the four
countries by 2014 (Figure 4).
Figure 3: Output gap estimates (percent of GDP)
Source: Bruegel based on AMECO.
Figure 4: Decline in debt-to-GDP ratio
(percentage points) in 2014 as a result of
output gap based transfers
Source: Bruegel.
Greece and Spain would have benefited from the
insurance scheme most, cutting their debt-to-GDP
ratios by 14.4 and 6.2 percentage  points respec-
tively by 2014. Ireland and Portugal would have
benefited less (2.6 and 4.4 percentage points
respectively), simply because their output gap
estimates are not as negative. The generic ‘south-
ern country’ would have reduced its debt-to-GDP
ratio 6.7 percentage points (close to the four coun-
try average of 6.9 percentage points). In the cal-
culations it is implicitly assumed that all the
transfers from the federal level are used to reduce
debt and not to run a looser fiscal policy.
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13. The scheme could be
structured also so that only
shortfalls sufficiently above
the euro-area output gap
would be compensated for
(Italianer & Pisani-Ferry
1992 ). The two schemes
have different implications
for the overall budget
position of the euro area,
with our choice being more
countercyclical.
14. This is because under
the above scheme a country
with an output gap of 1.9
percent would receive no
support, whereas a country
with an output gap of 2
percent would receive 0.5
percent of its annual output
as a transfer.
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scheme is the volatility of estimates of potential
GDP. This can be observed by looking at previous
European Commission estimates of the Greek
output gap (Figure 5).
Figure 5: Evolution of European Commission
estimates for Greek output gap (% of GDP)
Source: Bruegel based on AMECO.
The estimates for the Greek output gap have been
revised downwards many times. Therefore, the
actual transfers would have been considerably
smaller if they had been based on initial output-
gap estimates. Consequently, any transfer
scheme based on output gaps should have clear
rules concerning the revision of estimates and
whether this should result in ex-post corrections
to transfer payments.
GDP-linked bonds
The idea of indexing bonds to GDP as an insurance
against disappointing growth has been proposed
for instance by Borensztein and Mauro (2004).
Our counterfactual scenario is the following: prior
to 2008, countries issued long-term bonds (matu-
rity 10 years) up to 30 percent of GDP. It is
assumed that countries can only issue indexed
debt up to a limit, because investors fear that high
debt levels make countries prone to crises.
Because Ireland and Spain had issued less than
30 percent of GDP of long-term bonds at the end
of 2007, all their long-term bonds are assumed to
be indexed. The generic southern country is
assumed to have issued bonds up to the 30 per-
cent limit. However, the additional borrowing from
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2008 onwards is assumed to be non-indexed. This
is due to investors being averse to buying indexed
bonds at the beginning of a downturn.
The face value of the bonds evolves according to
deviations of nominal output from its baseline
path, which can be thought to have been agreed
between the issuing country and investors. The
base year is 2007. From then on the baseline
growth is equal to the projected nominal output
growth in the April 2008 World Economic Outlook.
The formula for the face value of the indexed
bonds is:
where Dtis the amount of outstanding debt; Dis
the amount originally lent and also the face value
to be repaid if growth is equal to baseline; Ytis the
level of nominal GDP at time t; and Ytbis the level
of baseline nominal GDP at that time. Figure 6 rep-
resents the dramatic shortfall in Greek nominal
GDP relative to the baseline.
Figure 6: Greece baseline (April 2008 WEO) and
actual nominal GDP (October 2012 WEO), €bns
Source: Bruegel based on WEO April 2008 (baseline) and WEO
October 2012 (actual).
Additionally it is assumed that the indexed bonds
pay a risk premium of 1.5 percent on top of the
interest rate on normal bonds to compensate for
increased variance of returns. The figure is
admittedly arbitrary. However, as Borensztein and
Mauro argue, risk premia on GDP-linked bonds
should not be excessive because there is
sufficient variation in GDP-growth rates across
countries. According to the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM), the premium should reflect only
  x      
Baseline nominal GDP
Actual
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The counterfactual debt-to-GDP ratio is calculated
by taking the difference between the face value of
the indexed bonds and those of regular bonds
accounting for the higher interest rate paid on the
indexed bonds. This amount is then added to the
actual debt-to-GDP ratio giving the counterfactual
ratio. Output data is from IMF WEO15and the base-
line interest rate (equal to the interest rate on
standard bonds) is the European Commission
estimate of the average interest rate of govern-
ment debt in 2008. Finally, the outstanding
amount of long-term bonds at the end of 2007 is
from Eurostat.
Figure 7 represents the decline in debt-to-GDP
ratios in 2014 if the four countries had issued
indexed debt.
Figure 7: Decline in debt-to-GDP ratio
(percentage points) in 2014  as a result of the
issuance of indexed bonds
Source: Bruegel.
From Figure 7 it can be seen that Greece (12.1 per-
centage points of GDP reduction) would have ben-
efited much more from such of a scheme than the
other three countries (average: 5.0 percentage
points of GDP). This has two explanations: first,
Greece started the crisis with high debt levels (and
consequently with high indexed debt), whereas
the build-up of debt in other countries occurred
only after the crisis. Second, the GDP shortfall from
baseline was the most dramatic in Greece. The
‘southern country’ would have benefited by 7.8
percentage points. As with alternative schemes,
the calculations do not try to incorporate any
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output effects caused by the reduced debt levels.
To provide some sensitivity analysis, Table 3 pro-
vides estimates of debt reduction based on differ-
ent risk premia. Even a risk premium of 3.5 percent
would have generated positive debt reduction in
all four countries.
A European Debt Agency (EDA) in line with the
Padoa-Schioppa group proposal (Enderlein et al,
2012)
The fourth scenario does not allow for an easy
counterfactual simulation. Presumably all coun-
tries would have entered the crisis with 20 percent
of GDP in common federal debt, which would have
decreased slightly the interest payments and con-
sequently the debt levels of crisis countries.
The average interest rate of general government
debt in 2008 was 4.3 percent in Germany, 4.9 per-
cent in Greece, 5.1 percent in Ireland, 4.6 percent
in Spain, and 4.5 percent in Portugal (AMECO). If
we imagine that the four countries would have bor-
rowed up to 20 percent of GDP before 2008 with
the German interest rate (through federal borrow-
ing), the yearly gain in lower interest rate pay-
ments would have been (5.1% - 4.3%) * 20% =
0.16% of 2008 GDP for Ireland, and somewhat
lower for the others. To calculate the cumulated
amount of savings up to 2014 we assume that the
legacy debt has a residual maturity of over six
years, so that it is not redeemed before then.
Countries facing a surge in their borrowing costs
after the financial crisis would have issued
another 20 percent of GDP in federal debt subject
to soft conditionality. In our simulation we assume
that the countries would have started issuing
common debt after their spread on 10 year bonds
Table 3: Sensitivity of decline in debt-to-GDP ratio
(percentage points) in 2014 to risk premium
Country/risk
premium
1% 1.5% 2.5% 3.5%
Greece 13.3 12.0 9.6 7.1
Ireland 6.0 5.3 4.0 2.7
Portugal 5.4 4.3 2.2 0.1
Spain 6.2 5.3 3.5 1.7
Southern country 8.9 7.8 5.6 3.4
Source: Bruegel.
15 . Because the April 2008
WEO only projects until
2013, we take nominal GDP
growth in 2014 to equal that
of the previous year. That
way we can compare the
results with alternative
schemes, which stretch
until 2014.
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relative to German y breached 2 percent. This
would have happened to Greece in December
2008, to Ireland in January 2009, to Portugal in
May 2010 and to Spain in June 2010.
Figure 8: Spreads of 10 year bonds over Bunds
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat.
To determine the amount of interest savings, we
study how long it would have taken to issue (in gross
terms) 20 percent of GDP in bonds by each country
after their cut-off point (ECB data)16. We calculate the
average spread over that period relative to German
Bunds, which we assume to represent the interest
saving achieved through federal borrowing. For the
‘southern country’ the yearly savings from the
second 20 percent of GDP of federal borrowing are
assumed to be 20 percent multiplied by the average
spread of the four countries.
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Figure 9: Decline in debt-to-GDP ratio
(percentage points) in 2014  as a result of
federal borrowing quotas
Source: Bruegel.
According to Figure 9, the savings range from 4.4
percentage points of GDP for Greece to 2.4 per-
centage points for Spain. Most of the benefits
come from being able to borrow at lower rates
during crisis times (the second 20 percent) to
avoid paying an elevated spread. In net present
value terms the savings are even bigger because
Figure 9 does not take into account the savings on
interest payments after 2014.
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Figure 10: Time series of the evolution of debt-to-GDP ratios according to diﬀerent schemes
Source: Bruegel.
16. Portugal did not have
the time to issue up to 20
percent of GDP in bonds
between their cut-off date
and their rescue package.
Nevertheless, we calculate
the amount of savings as if
they would have, because
the rescue date is
presumably endogenous.